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CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
In a mandamus suit to compel the corporate defendant to allow
the plaintiff-pledgee of shares of stock in defendant to vote the
pledged shares,' the debt, which the pledged secured, had matured
and was due and demandable. The Business Corporation Law provides that a "person whose shares are pledged shall be entitled to vote
thereon unless and until such shares are transferred on the books of
the corporation to the pledgee; and thereafter the pledgee shall be
entitled to vote thereon."' The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit
held that the statute granted no right to a pledgee to have pledged
shares transferred on the books and thereby be entitled to vote thereon, but merely regulated entitlement to vote. The court relied on
article 3165 of the Louisiana Civil Code which provides the procedure
to be taken by a pledgee-creditor when his debtor defaults. This
procedure requires a judgment in the ordinary course of law. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the Louisiana supreme court
3
decision in D'Amico v. Canizaro.
The effect of the decision is that
there is no conflict between the Civil Code and the corporation statute. If a pledgor consents, or the pledgee is otherwise authorized to
have the pledged shares transferred on the books of the corporation,
the pledgee may then, and only then, vote such shares. The fact that
a debt is matured, due and demandable gives only the right to secure
judgment and have the shares sold in accordance with Civil Code
article 3165.
In a contest over who should be appointed receiver of the assets
of a nonprofit corporation, it was contended that three co-receivers
appointed by the court had shown a lack of interest and should be
replaced.' The lack of interest alleged was a failure to file an oath. It
was held that there is no requirement for filing an oath and that the
"judgment appointing the receiver . . . is absolute and becomes executory upon its rendition. . . ."I Inasmuch as R.S. 12:258, governing
the appointment of receivers for nonprofit corporations, and R.S.
12:151, governing business corporations, are idential with regard to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Emile M. Babst Co., Inc. v. Commercial Enter., Inc., 274 So. 2d 742 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973).
2. LA. R.S. 12:75(D) (Supp. 1968), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 50 § 4.
3. 256 La. 801, 239 So. 2d 339 (1970). See also Chappuis v. Spencer, 167 La. 527,
119 So. 697 (1928).
4. In re Westminster Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., 275 So. 2d 904 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
5. Id.at 907.
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the procedure, the case should be equally applicable to business corporations.
In two cases, the courts had occasion to consider the effect on the
corporation of knowledge of facts by an agent' or by a member of a
board of directors.7 The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit' recognized the principle that information informally given to corporate
agents or officers is imputable to the corporation. This was dictum
inasmuch as the court found that the information, concerning a
change in ownership which would affect the amount of insurance
premiums, was not in fact given to an agent of the corporation. Although not stating the limitation, the court obviously intended to
restrict its statement of the principle properly to cases where the
information was within the scope of the authority of the agent to act
on behalf of the corporation. In D'Aubin v. Mauroner-Craddock,
Inc., ' the supreme court, in reversing the court of appeal," held that
knowledge of the chairman of the board of a corporation that unauthorized payments were being made was not the knowledge of the
corporation. The basis for its correct decision in this regard was the
finding that the knowledge in this case was not within the general
authority of the board member to act for the corporation. The opinion
implies that had the board member been a "dominant figure," or had
administrative responsibilities related to the transaction, or had he
acted for the corporation in the matter, his knowledge would have
been equivalent to knowledge by the corporation, in which event
there would have been a breach of fiduciary obligation.
6. Ed Jones, Jr., Inc. v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972).
7. D'Aubin v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 262 La. 350, 263 So. 2d 317 (1972).
8. Ed Jones, Jr., Inc. v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 268 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972).
9. 262 La. 350, 263 So. 2d 317 (1972).
10. See 251 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).

